Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Boyd Law
Nevada Supreme Court Summaries

Law Journals

5-14-2020

City of Henderson v. Spangler, 136 Nev. Adv. Op. 25 (May 14,
2020)
Connor J. Bodin

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nvscs

Recommended Citation
Bodin, Connor J., "City of Henderson v. Spangler, 136 Nev. Adv. Op. 25 (May 14, 2020)" (2020). Nevada
Supreme Court Summaries. 1313.
https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nvscs/1313

This Case Summary is brought to you by the Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Boyd Law, an institutional repository
administered by the Wiener-Rogers Law Library at the William S. Boyd School of Law. For more information, please
contact youngwoo.ban@unlv.edu.

City of Henderson v. Spangler, 136 Nev. Adv. Op. 25 (May 14, 2020)1
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION: COMPENSABILITY OF PREEXISTING CONDITIONS
AGGRAVATED BY OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES

Summary
City of Henderson Police Officer Jared Spangler sought workers’ compensation benefits,
alleging that workplace conditions aggravated his significant loss of hearing. Multiple medical
experts opined that Spangler’s hearing loss likely preexisted his employment, but that the
workplace conditions increased his symptoms. However, the City’s compensation administrator
denied Spangler’s claim because Spangler failed to show that his symptoms arose out of his
employment. The appeals officer affirmed the decision, but the district court reversed.
On review, the Nevada Court of Appeals first determined that Spangler alleged an
“occupational disease” and not an “accidental injury.” Second, they clarified two historical uses
of the word “preexisting”—one meaning preexisting the claim, the other meaning preexisting the
employment. Third, they discovered that Spangler’s claim was governed by NRS 617.366(1),
which provides that a preexisting condition could be compensable if an occupational disease
aggravates the condition. Finally, they determined that the appeals officer’s decision to deny the
claim was based on (1) an erroneous interpretation of the relevant statutes, and (2) a failure to
apply NRS 617.366(1). Spangler needed only to show that his preexisting condition was
aggravated by an occupational disease. Thus, the court affirmed the district court’s reversal and
remanded for further proceedings.
Background
This case arises out of City of Henderson Police Officer Jared Spangler’s second claim for
workers’ compensation benefits, made in 2016. Spangler’s first claim was in 2005 and alleged that
the work-related noises—gun shots, sirens, radio chatter—caused him significant loss of hearing.
The claim was denied, because the medical expert determined Spangler’s symptoms preexisted his
employment. Spangler did not appeal.
Then, in 2016, Spangler filed a second claim, again alleging that the exposure to the same
work-related noises caused his condition to worsen. During this time, Spangler consulted three
medical experts to determine the cause of his hearing loss. The first expert opined that, while the
condition may have preexisted Spangler’s employment, the work-related sounds caused an
increase in Spangler’s hearing loss. The second expert equivocally opined that job noise exposure
might have worsened the hearing loss. Before Spangler consulted the third expert, the City’s
workers compensation administrator denied Spangler’s claim. In preparation for appeal, Spangler
sought a third medical expert, who opined that Spangler’s condition preexisted his employment,
but that the work environment was a contributory factor in the worsening of his condition.
Ultimately, the appeals officer affirmed the denial of the claim, reasoning that Spangler failed to
show an “injury by accident” or “occupational disease.”
Spangler petitioned for judicial review, whereby the district court granted the petition and
reversed the appeals officer’s decision. The City then appealed the district court’s orders, which
brought the matter before the Nevada Supreme Court.
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Discussion
The City argued that the appeals officer (1) correctly interpreted “accident” as defined by
NRS 616A.030; (2) correctly found that Spangler did not establish an “injury by accident” under
NRS 616C.175(1); and (3) correctly found that Spangler’s condition was not a compensable
“occupational disease” under NRS 617.440.2
Standard of Review
When reviewing an administrative agency’s decision, after a petition for judicial review,
the court of appeals grants no deference to the district court’s decision.3 If the administrative
agency’s fact-based conclusions of law are sound and supported by substantial evidence, the court
will not reverse them.4 Evidence is substantial if a reasonable mind could find it adequate to
support a conclusion.5 However, the court of appeals reviews administrative agency’s conclusions
of law de novo.6
There are two types of work-induced conditions that compensable: (1) an “injury” under
NRS Chapters 616A-D; or (2) an “occupational disease” under NRS Chapter 617.7
Whether Spangler’s hearing loss constitutes a compensable “injury by accident” under NRS
Chapters 616A-D
The court quotes NRS 616A.030, which defines an “accident” as “an unexpected or
unforeseen event happening suddenly and violently, with or without human fault, and producing
at the time objective symptoms of an injury.”8 Spangler did not allege that his symptoms arose
from a single, unforeseen event, but that they gradually worsened from his continuous exposure to
the work-related noises. To this point, the court relied on the medical experts’ reports, none of
which opined that a single incident caused Spangler’s condition. Thus, the court concluded that
substantial evidence supported the appeals officer’s decision that Spangler’s claim did not
establish an “injury by accident.”
Whether Spangler’s hearing loss constitutes a compensable “occupational disease” under NRS
Chapter 617
The court then turns to the more contentious question of whether Spangler’s condition was
an “occupational disease.” To be a compensable “occupational disease,” the court emphasizes that
(1) the employee must show that occupational environment was most likely the cause of the
disease, and (2) the employee must show a disablement resulting from the disease and not just the
mere contraction.9
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Before continuing with their analysis, the court reiterates Spangler’s allegation. Spangler
alleged that although his hearing loss preexisted his employment, his employment made his
hearing loss significantly worse to the point where he could no longer perform his duties. As such,
he alleged NRS 617.440 covers his condition, despite it being preexisting.
The meaning of “preexisting”
First, the court clarified the Nevada Supreme Court’s use of the term “preexisting.” In the
past, the Court used the term in two different ways. In one way, “preexisting” refers to physical
symptoms and physical states that preexisted the claim for benefits, even though they may not have
preexisted the employment.10 In another way, Spangler’s way, “preexisting” refers to physical
symptoms and physical states that preexisted the employment entirely. To elucidate the difference,
the court references numerous cases where they use “preexisting” in the former manner and
contrast them with NRS 617.366, which uses “preexisting” in the latter manner.11 The court notes
that neither party cited to NRS 617.366, although the statute governs the issue at hand, as it
provides that a condition shall be deemed to be an occupational disease, and almost certainly
compensable, if an employee (1) has a condition that preexists any employment, and (2) develops
an occupational disease that worsens the condition.12
The court summarized the point by recognizing four distinct types of “preexisting
conditions”: (1) A condition developed on the job that preexists the time of the claim.13 (2) A
condition that preexists the employment that is worsened by a “sudden injury.”14 (3) A condition
that preexists the employment that is worsened by a “occupational disease.”15 (4) An “occupational
disease” that is worsened by nonindustrial aggravation.16 The court found that Spangler’s claims
fell within the third type, governed by NRS 617.366 (1).
The meaning of “condition” and “occupational disease” within the statutes
After determining Spangler’s claim fell under NRS 617.366(1), the court interpreted the
key terms of the statute, specifically “condition” and “occupational disease.”17 The court notes
that, within the statute, a meaningful difference exists between the terms, but that the statute fails
to provide a definition for either. Here, the court wearily prepares to interpret the statute, but avoids
the endeavor by a convenient fact: the parties agreed that Spangler’s condition would be an
occupational disease if the condition was sufficiently connected to Spangler’s employment. In
other words, the parties only disputed the connection. Thus, the court determined that Spangler’s
claim was eligible for compensation under NRS 617.366(1) as a matter of law.
The appeals officer’s findings of fact and conclusions of law
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Finally, the court assessed the appeals officer’s denial of the claim based on the evidence
presented. The court referred back to the three medical experts’ opinions. Each expert determined
that while Spangler’s condition preexisted his employment, the work-sounds made the symptoms
substantially worse. The court tried to understand why the appeals officer, presented with the same
evidence, affirmed the denial of the claim. They concluded that the appeals officer mistakenly
expected Spangler to show that his condition was entirely attributable to his employment. The
appeals officer also failed to apply NRS 616.366(1), which should have governed. However,
contrary to the appeals officer’s conclusion, the relevant statutes do not permit denial solely
because the condition was preexisting. The court found that Spangler should simply have been
burdened to show that his preexisting hearing loss that was made worse by the work-sounds. Thus,
the court concluded that the appeals officer incorrectly applied the relevant statutes.
Conclusion
Because the appeals officer’s factual findings were inconsistent with the correct statutory
interpretations, the court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.
Thus, the court affirmed the district court’s decision, but on different grounds, specifically a correct
application of NRS 617.366(1). The court instructed the district court to remand the matter back
to the appeals officer.

